Abstract This interdisciplinary investigation of aspects of 3D character animation synthesizes relevant research findings from diverse perspectives, including neuroscience, narratology, robotics, anthropology, cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind, and considers how they might be integrated as theory for animators and animation studies. The article focuses on the creative nature of character conception and creation in a 3D animated environment and on aspects of character -narrative and style, in particular. It examines how findings from interdisciplinary research on the embodied mind-brain, including neuroscientific research with regard to mentalizing and simulation theory, can inform the creative animation process and might be gainfully synthesized in an animation studies context to inform both pedagogy and creative practice.
Introduction
There is a dearth of theoretical analysis of animation compared to other arts or media and, until recently, theory addressing the specificities of the creative animation process has been particularly scarce.
Animators are often researchers but, whereas a few may explore the nature of their art through written research, the primary mode of enquiry for most is research by practice. Theory and practice are symbiotic in the context of creative animation praxis, as Ward (2006) has argued, and the development of integrated theoretical approaches relevant to both animation studies and creative practice ought surely to be a salient consideration for academics concerned with animation. Towards this end, this article synthesizes research from eclectic disciplines, mainly enquiry into the embodied mind and brain, which is directly relevant to animation.
The domain in focus here is 3D CGI-based character animation and, more specifically, theoretical approaches that might enable an animator to creatively conceive, create and animate narrative characters in this environment. Although 3D character animation is used extensively in visualization, games and advertising, the focus here is on character animation for narrative film. Many of the issues under discussion, however, will have a wider resonance for other forms of animation and indeed other arts practice.
This article considers the relationship between broadly scientific research into the embodied mind-brain and research into the artsanimation, in particular. It then turns to character animation and focuses on the intentionality and agency of character and the cognitive and neural processes that underlie our anthropomorphic perceptions of character motivation. This, in turn, leads to a broader exploration of character motivation as the essential dynamic that drives narrative and, finally, to aspects of style, in particular the dialectic between realism and more expressive styles. At each stage, relevant interdisciplinary theory, including neuroscientific research, is synthesized and integrated with direct relevance to animation practice. The hypothesis is that theory and findings from different levels of broadly science-based research not only explain aspects of the animator's art, but also enable fresh creative perspectives in animation practice.
Broadening and deepening the research context for animation
It is important, I think, to take heed of recent advances in the neurosciences, without believing that to say 'human' jeopardizes our individuality or overlooks the social and political pressures that contribute to its social construction. (Freedberg, 2004) interdisciplinary approaches from sciences through humanities to the arts. Patricia Smith Churchland (2002) , who instigated neurophilosophy, supports the 'integration of neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy in a comprehensive theoretical framework ' (p. 3) , and she proposes the use of the compound term mind-brain to this end. Vibeke Sorensen (2002) , animation artist and Founding Chair of Animation and Digital Arts at the University of Southern California, advocates (and engages in) collaboration with different fields, such as complexity, cognitive science and neuroscience. 'The connections between seemingly unrelated fields and ideas catalyze insight and innovation, and stimulate the crossover of ideas and technology', and she argues that this is very much to the benefit of animators. Over 70 years ago, Walt Disney (1935) encouraged using 'a scientific approach to this business' to educate animators and, although scientific research has fed into animation, especially through technology development, there has been little recognition of the fact that research from other areas of scientific enquiry can inform the animation process.
Feedback between the arts and scientific approaches to the study of the mind and brain is hardly new; the arts certainly have always been concerned with the human condition. David Lodge (2003) sees the arts primarily as an exploration of consciousness, and quotes Noam Chomsky as saying it is possible 'we will always learn more about human life and personality from novels than from scientific psychology' (p. 10). Semir Zeki (1999) , one of a few neuroscientists who studies aesthetics directly, acknowledges the contribution of the arts to studies of the mind. 'I believe that artists are, in a sense, neurologists, studying the brain with techniques that are unique to them' (p. 10). Margaret Livingstone (2005) , a Neurobiology Professor at Harvard, is another: 'artists have been studying how we see a lot longer than us neurobiologists. The disciplines of art and science converge at the biology of vision'. 1 Much of the traffic up to now has been in one direction: the arts, including animation, exploring through practice the workings of consciousness and the mind. In an era when technologies such as fMRI scanning are enabling new insights into brain functioning, and this research is feeding directly into disciplines such as neuroesthetics, psychology and consciousness studies, we should also apply the latest scientific research, where appropriate, in the context of animation studies. Sorensen (2003) says that this will happen: 'the arts are not teaching scientific concepts as much as they could. But this is changing. ' Ironically, animation is often requisitioned by other disciplines in their explorations of the mind and brain. Chaminade et al. (2007) recognize that 'computer-animated characters are invaluable tools to investigate the neural bases of social cognition.' As early as the 1940s, psychologists Heider and Simmel (1944) used animated film to research causality and social perception, and demonstrated that we have a strong tendency to infer human causal characteristics, for example goals, from the motion of inanimate objects. Recently, from a similar perspective, Mar and Macrae (2006) researching social psychology through the psychology of narrative, studied fMRI scans of participants viewing both animated footage and the live action video from which it was rotoscoped. The works used were Richard Linklater's Waking Life (2001) and A Scanner Darkly (2006) , and the brain's reactions to live action could be compared directly to its animated counterpart using fMRI scans (Figure 1 ). Whereas this research explores the psychology of narrative media consumption, it also enables interesting insights into the animator's art. Incidentally, both these works are prominent examples of animation practice that overtly explores aspects of mind-brain through the expressive aesthetic afforded by animating from live-action.
So what do findings from such diverse fields as biopsychology, cognitive studies, neurology and related fields mean for the character animator besides offering a deeper background understanding of the psychological and neurological processes that come into play when an audience engages with their work? Ward (2006) advocates weak classification in animation, the bottom line being: 'is what someone is arguing coherent and of interest, rather than "does this belong in Animation Studies?"' (p. 242). The synthesis of relevant scientific findings outlined here is relevant, and I hope coherent, and can enable a deeper understanding of character development, storytelling, animation and audience response. Character in narrative animation is a constructed model of the embodied, motivated mind, and so is a natural if indirect focus of neuroscientific and related research.
Character animation
Characters are usually entities within a narrative discourse, although they are sometimes created for use outside this context. Characters have also been ubiquitous recently as interface agents, particularly in research projects, but interface design is outside the scope of this article, and likewise character design for games. Of course, just as we can draw from research in other disciplines, what can be theorized about character creation as a result may also comprise relevant theory to practitioners in other environments.
A character in this context is more than an animated entity. A tree or a car can be animated but does not have to be a character. A human entity need not comprise a character if sufficiently peripheral to a story so that it is effectively objectified while, on the other hand, a house is the title character in Oscar-nominated Monster House (Gil Kenan, 2006) . A character (unusually but conceivably) could be without visual representation at all -for example, the title character in an animated version of Waiting for Godot, or a diegetic narrator we can hear but not see.
What defines a character within a narrative context is that it is an entity with agency: an intentional agent relevant to the story. Bal (1997: 5) makes a distinction between actors that are agents in a fabula (series of related events), and characters in a story that is a mediated presentation of that fabula. In terms of importance in the narrative, characters may be anywhere on a continuum from central to supporting, peripheral or background. E.M. Forster in Aspects of the Novel (1956) distinguished between round and flat characters (in terms of complexity). Pixar used a proprietary crowd system for animating hundreds of ants seen in the ant colony in A Bug's Life (John Lasseter, 1998) . These extras are background characters to such an extent that they are animated using swarming systems and not as individuals. It seems as if they exist as setting rather than characters. 'Psychologically, character is a mental model of an actor in a story', and the modern conception of character both in the arts and everyday terms is an entity that is 'affected by experience, built of goals, intentions, and emotions, from which actions flow' (Oatley and Mar, 2005: 189) . Characters then are salient intentional agents within the story-world, and their motivated intent drives plot.
The character as intentional agent
Mentalizing or theory of mind (ToM) broadly refers to our ability to understand the intentionality of other subjects and is also called mindreading or adapting the intentional stance. This concept can help deepen our understanding of animated intentional agents within the story-world. Although this notion of intentional stance stems initially from Dennett's (1989) philosophy, it has been modified and updated by neuroscientific research using fMRI scans (neuroscience research commonly takes propositions from other disciplines as a starting point), see Figure 2 .
In the journal Nature, Whitfield (2006) , summarizes research confirming that 'the brain distinguishes movements that might seem to have intentions from other movements', and movement implying agency will trigger extra responses. We often see quite abstract nonliving representations as if they were intentional agents, and our enjoyment of animation, comics and novels depends on 'an ability to adopt the intentional stance toward clearly non-intentional (and nonbiological) objects' (Mar and Macrae, 2006: 111) ; having a low threshold for triggering the intentional stance conferred evolutionary advantage.
In character animation, the capacity to trigger the intentional stance offers the creative affordance that any entity could conceivably be a character in a narrative, providing that the nature of its form and behaviour can trigger appropriate mentalizing, as 'this capacity to view others as possessing mental states can be directed to targets other than conspecifics ' (p. 110) . This anthropomorphic response can be induced even by simple 2D animations using certain kinds of motion; for example, combined change in speed and change in direction (Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000: 305) . Other cues include moving in response to other objects and self-propelled motion. Sound can also be a very effective trigger. Appropriate triggering of agency and mentalizing is fundamental both in terms of character design and narrative believability (and at a deeper level underpins the whole narrative experience).
Mirror-neurons and simulation
Phenomena can be studied at various levels from quantum particles through to society, culture, arts and politics (Damasio, 2004; Wheeler, 2006) . It may be productive, however, for animators to approach phenomena at some levels of inquiry but not at others, while appropriate enquiry at each level is important too (see Figure 3 ). For example, there is no meaning in asking how your neurons feel about
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something, but it may be worth investigating the neural correlates of a particular emotion or state of mind. Underlying perceptions of agency at the level of the brain are mirror-neurons, known collectively as the mirror neuron system (MNS). 2 These neurons fire in response to one's own goal-related motor-actions but also respond to perceived similar actions in other entities. Mirror-neurons have intrinsically social functionality; they 'map the actions of others to corresponding actions on one's own body' without confusing other with self (Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2006 : 1832 . 'Mirror neurons not only underpin action understanding, but they are also involved in understanding the intentions that underlie action' (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007: 200) . 3 It is important that we distinguish between 'a mental simulation of action, actual simulation of action and understanding the intention behind an observed action' (Agnew et al., 2007) . It is widely accepted that the MNS resonates with the 'what' of a goal-directed action, but it is increasingly evidentially associated with the 'why', involving it not only in understanding the behaviour of others, but with predicting it too (Iacoboni et al., 2005) .
Simulation Theory (ST) sees mentalizing as based on the MNS -a form of embodied emotion-based cognition, where 'understanding of another is built upon concurrent engagement of affective and motor systems in the self' (Mar and Macrae, 2006: 111) . 4 Simulation and mentalizing are separate but related brain processes according to Chaminade et al. (2007: 215) and they have explored the 'dissociation of the brain activity in these two key networks of social cognition'. Modell (2006: 181) advocates this MNS-based approach, and reiterates this two-stage process of selection then interpretation
The view on mentalizing proposed here is that mirror-neurons (and affective systems) resonate in response to cues for agency and intentionality, enabling rapid pre-reflective simulation, triggering in turn higher-order prediction of intent such as proto-narrative and scenariobased meaning. In an animation context, MNS-based simulation drives anthropomorphic-based presumptions of agency and intentionality, feeds embodied proto-narrative and gesture, and enables empathy with character that in turn feeds animated narrative. 5
The embodied mind-brain, mimetic gesture and animation Creativity, art and culture are often considered to have their roots in mimetic simulation. Herbert Lindenberger (2007) , Humanities Professor at Stanford, says 'recent research on mirror neurons suggests that the imitative capacities . . . may well account for the development of empathy and the evolution of culture' (p. 3). Wheeler (2006) sees creativity as 'born in mimesis, in gesture' (p. 142), while Damasio (2004) sees the MNS as the basis of as-if body states involved in empathy, mind-reading and narrative engagement (pp. 115-21). Ramachandran (2004) sees art as having evolved as a form of MNSbased simulation (Oberman et al., 2007 ). Ramachandran's (2004) theory of neuroesthetics suggests several laws of art based on neural research (p. 44). Although he underlines the speculative nature of this research, and his understanding of aesthetics seems tenuous at times, his theories do offer potentially valuable insights into the fundamentals of aesthetic effect.
Freedberg (Professor of Art History) and Gallese (Professor of Human Physiology) suggest that simulation underpins aesthetic experience in many diverse respects: simulating actions and intentions, manipulation of objects, emotion and sensation, and the implied gesture. Even a still-life can be animated by 'the embodied simulation it evokes in the observer's brain'. Automatic empathetic responses and the process of embodied simulation that underpins them enable 'the direct experiential understanding of the intentional and emotional contents of images', and are consequently 'essential to any understanding of their effectiveness as art' (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007: 202) .
Modell, Professor of Psychiatry, (2006) distinguishes between intentionality as expressed through iconic gesture in all primates (based on mimesis) and a more complex metaphoric gesture unique to humans (pp. 187-92). MNS-based mimetic gesture underpins more sophisticated and transformative metaphoric modes of communication.
In an animation context, the MNS and embodied simulation underpin movement, iconic gesture, mentalizing, empathy with characters and overall narrative engagement with animated representation, and contribute likewise to aesthetic response to metaphoric gesture and stylistic expressiveness.
Neural research with dancers and capoeira practitioners shows that mirror-neuron activation is stronger and more effective when observers have specific motor representation for the action they observed -that is, if they have practised the moves themselves (CalvoMerin et al., 2005) . This would appear to confirm the usefulness of embodied approaches to character animation such as those advocated by Wells (1998: 104-21) and Hooks (2003) in Acting for Animators.
Walt Disney recognized the benefits of acting and 'started production on Snow White by acting out the entire script, playing every character himself' (Chris, 1995) . He wanted animators to study expressive motion scientifically, and to have an 'appreciation of acting' (Disney, 1935) . Both Wells (1998) and Hooks (2003) also advocate Stanislavsky's acting theories and Laban movement theory for animators. Laban developed a system for understanding the more subtle and expressive characteristics of movement with respect to inner intention. Embodied approaches are based on the interpenetration of physiological/mental processes and their relevance is highlighted by the fact that several research projects (Neff and Fiume, 2005) are active in developing 3D animation applications that integrate Laban theory in their animation algorithms to enable body shape and movement 'that reflects the character's inner state and personality' (Neff and Fiume, 2006) . It is also being used to synthesize motion capture data and to generate expressive variations and subtleties based on motivated intent (Eisenberg, 2003) . Simulation-based gesture, mentalizing and empathy are at the heart of such embodied techniques and are soon to be embedded (however successfully) in 3D animation applications.
The intentional agent as character in animation
Mentalizing and simulation are not triggered by animation or movement alone, or even by perceived life (for example, grass or plants), but by cues that involve a presumption of agency. This distinction could perhaps best be characterized as how the mind differentiates between responses to movement and action, and involves a spontaneous anthropomorphized simulation that predicts an entity's constraints and affordances, desires, motivation, intention and goals. This proto-narrative comprises an agenda for the perceived entity and its consequent meaning for the perceiver.
Disney realized that many of his animators failed to grasp intentionality intuitively and needed training in character motivation. In an inter-office memo sent in 1935 he said that they did not understand what really makes things move: why they move -what the force behind the movement is. In other words, in most instances, the driving force behind the action is the mood, the personality, the attitude of the character -or all three. Therefore, the mind is the pilot.
In the same memo, he added that these ideas were convergent with animation concepts, such as anticipation and overlapping action, and suggested that besides technology and technique, an animator should be educated in caricature, in motivated action, in acting and in story construction. Dennett (1989) proposed the triggering of different levels of stance: a physical, a design and then an intentional stance. At the level of intentional stance predictions would be triggered as to what beliefs and desires this character has and how it would be likely to behave in the social context depicted. This third level is highly relevant at the narrative or story level, where desire and goals are important both for character and plot and where weaknesses in character motivation can drastically weaken narrative impact.
If we take as an example John Lasseter's seminal 3D character animated short, Luxo Jr (Pixar, 1986) , the physical stance is triggered by both the form and the movement of the lamp (in the opening shot, the precise self-propelled movement of the head of the lamp implies agency), the design stance is triggered by the constraints and affordances of the lamp in terms of perceived functionality (and what we already know about lamps), and the intentional stance predicts the behaviour of the lamps as characters with agency in a social milieu. Much of the aesthetic pleasure in this work comes from having our initial stance subverted as the lamp segues seamlessly in our perceptions from being a household object to an anthropomorphized character with agency: a parent with a child in a complex playful social relationship.
An awareness of intentional stance, mentalizing and simulation theory can be used to trigger aesthetic engagement through more credible motion, physical behaviour and narrative social behaviour of characters. To show that 'the thoughts of a character are driving its actions, a simple trick is in the anticipation; always lead with the eyes or the head' says Lasseter (1994) . 'The only time that the eyes or head would not lead the action would be when an external force is driving the character's movements, as opposed to his thought process'; just one simple but profound embodiment of mentalizing applied to animation process theory. But, as evident with Luxo Jr, there are many ways that such spontaneous reactions to agency can be manipulated aesthetically. They can be transformed, anticipated, amplified, caricatured, undercut or subverted for aesthetic effect, and animation offers far more affordance to achieve this than do many of the other arts. Though talented or experienced animators may intuit such phenomena, awareness of the underlying mind-brain phenomena can inform creative practice. Animation artist and academic, Vibeke Sorensen (2005) , advocates scientific education in this respect, saying she has been 'deeply influenced by the new emphases on biology and ecology, and the new discoveries in neurophysiology'.
Anthropomorphism, personification and metaphor
Anthropomorphism, pervasive in animation, is 'the practice of attributing intentionality, purpose or volition to some creature or abstraction that (allegedly) does not have these things' (Tyler, 2003: 269) . Its roots are in perceived agency and, as evidenced by Chaminade et al. (2007) , intentionality, mentalizing and simulation are at its core. Anthropomorphism is a tricky polysemic concept and has been derided particularly in science but also in the arts. Friedrich Nietzsche considered it inevitable as we cannot step outside our own embodied perceptual systems (Guthrie, 1995: 124) . Guthrie sees personification as an aspect of the broader concept of anthropomorphism that applies to the arts. This may be a useful distinction as metaphors and other tropes that anthropomorphize -such as Ruskin's pathetic fallacy -are seen as aspects of personification in turn.
The predominance of personification in children's media is related to the fact that children are particularly prone to anthropomorphism. 'Children and even infants interpret phenomena as humanlike, or caused by humans, or both . . . In sum, the research shows that a generalized anthropomorphism is spontaneous and primitive in children and persists in adults' (Guthrie, 2005: 121) . Rorschach inkblot tests are usually interpreted anthropomorphically from an early age and cross-cultural tests suggest this tendency is universal. Mentalizing capacity is normally acquired by children around 4 years of age and develops until around 11 (Abu-Akel, 2003 ).
An anthropomorph (anthropomorphic character) is neither human nor other but on the edge of chaos, both at once. It is a liminal shapeshifter, playing in the interstitial spaces of becoming, of representational transformation. Anthropomorphs like Stuart Little or Mickey Mouse engage us in Ramachandran's neuroesthetic concept of perceptual problem solving: 'we do not know whether we see a mouse in man's clothing or a man in a mouse's body. We probably see both' (Guthrie, 1995: 124) . They also embody creative ambiguity -one of Zeki's three principles of the visual brain (alongside constancy and abstraction). He describes it as not vagueness or uncertainty but, paradoxically, the certainty of different scenarios each of which has equal validity (Zeki, 2004: 173) .
Metaphor is also embedded in the anthropomorph. The neuroesthetic concept of metaphor sees our brain evolved at several levels to notice connections between inputs (Ramachandran, 2004: 44) , and an anthropomorph is a sign that points in more than one way at once. Modell (2006) observes that 'metaphor mediates, categorises, and thus organises the perception of bodily sensations' as feelings (p. 145). 6 He differentiates between a metaphoric process that merely transfers meaning and a more complex human-specific metaphoric process that transforms it (p. 148). So, for example, through metaphorical sublimation, as if through alchemy, base emotions such as anger or disgust can be transformed to the gold of more sublime aesthetic experience in an arts context. The idea of a rat in a restaurant would normally evoke disgust, but Remy the rodent/chef anthromorph in Ratatouille (Bird, 2007) is more likely instead to engage and intrigue aesthetically.
Anthropomorphic signification is never neutral, it means something (Baker, 2001) , and that something can also change over time. Sergei Eisenstein was initially entranced by Disney's anthropomorphic representations, making connections between animal, anima, animism and animation and seeing animated anthropomorphs as transformative metaphors connecting us with our shared evolutionary past (Leslie, 2004: 243) . For Walter Benjamin too, early Mickey Mouse had transformative resonance (Leslie, 2004: 81) but as Mickey got older he got younger and cuter. Neoteny in anthropomorphs (where signifiers of youth are exaggerated for cuteness) is a recognized cognitive phenomenon and Stephen Jay Gould, a palaeontologist and evolutionary biologist, analysed the evolving neotenization of Mickey Mouse over many years (Baker, 2001) . Neotenous characteristics signify innocence and can be used in animation to trigger empathy or a caring response.
Anthropomorphism is an innate and pervasive perceptual predisposition based on simulation, ambiguity and metaphor. It is the conceptual rooted in the perceptual, and artists -from Palaeolithic cave painters to 3D animators -have always triggered it for effect. Anthropomorphic personification is so pervasive in cartoon and 3D feature animation that it is virtually synonymous stylistically with these genres. The anthropomorph as an intentional character that can play and resonate on any number of aesthetic levels: creative ambiguity, defamiliarization, play of representation, imagination, symbolism, appeal to children, fantasy, surrealism, the uncanny, humour, shapeshifting or morphing, magic realism, subversion, irony, satire, jouissance and so on.
Anthropomorphism automatically engages a narrative dimension. We see animal-based anthropomorphs as a 'kind of furry subjunctive case for the story', a proto-narrative personified, a what-if scenario (Daston and Mitman, 2006: 7) . Narrative need not be ostensibly anthropomorphic (though at a basic level of perception it always is). Anthropomorphs however, by virtue of their liminal dynamics, always personify a tale to be told.
From proto-narrative to narrative
Storytellers, including animators, tend to be practitioners, with just a few theorizing explicitly on the nature of their art. Theory of narrative production, as distinct from comprehension, 'remains a very difficult and somewhat neglected problem' (Mar, 2004 (Mar, : 1429 , and narrative neuro-scientific research often depends on theory from other fields as a starting point (or from practice as with Waking Life), and research findings ought to feed back into cognitive and other models of how narrative works.
The problem of what Coleridge called 'suspension of disbelief' (having strong emotional responses to fictional situations) is largely outside the scope of this article, but mentalizing and its underlying mirror-neuronal processes are involved. 7 Our emotional responses to representations of entities that we may perceive to be intentional agents can be very real (Rolls, 2005: 452) if these entities are believable in the context of the narrative. Oatley and Mar (2005) suggest that fiction can be true, 'but at a different conceptual level than that of the everyday' (p. 182). 'It's like a social relationship', says writer and dramatist Michael Frayn (2007): 'a story entertains you -you entertain the story' (p. 245). 'The story is the paradigm', Frayn claims (p. 251), and whether it is fictional or factual is a secondary issue. All fictional universes depend on what Gardner (1991) calls believability as distinct from truth, and mentalizing addresses important aspects of what the animator must consider if an animated character is to be believable, taking into account how it looks, its perceived functional design and its perceived intent and consequent motivated animated behaviour.
Contrary to intuition, the embodied brain sees no light or hears no sounds, but instead actively and selectively elicits electro-chemical signals from its environment and creates hypotheses or scenarios about the world. The brain is not just a receptive system, it is perceptive; it does not record, but constructs through value-driven selection, or cathexis. 'This dynamic blend of receptivity and creativity' is the essence of perception and 'that which we call imagination is from the first an attribute of the senses themselves' (Abram, 1997: 38) . Agency is perceived as salient and simulated spontaneously on given cues. Moment-to-moment multimodal perception involves proactive emotion-motivated creation of a scenario of meaning for the organism in its environment, searching out certain aspects, exaggerating some, simulating or ignoring others in a way analogous in some respects to how an animator selectively interprets a scene or a writer a scenario. Relevant memories are activated; emotion-salient memories have more significance and are rapid access. This on-the-fly scenario or protonarrative has an aetiological or causal structure, is affectively driven, and its implications for the individual constitute meaning and motivation towards action.
Pulitzer Prize-winning writer, Robert Olen Butler (2006) , pinpoints desire as the driving force of plot. If the character's yearning, desire and motivation are not manifest then narrative does not work, certainly not at the level of art (p. 40). Plot represents the dynamics of desire and motivation, and triggering believable mentalizing within the dynamics of the narrative itself is crucial for effective narrative engagement. Mar (2004) suggests that the medial prefrontalcortex is responsible for mentalizing, 'another narrative subprocess', and is activated both in narrative production and reception (p.1427). A storyteller uses mentalizing at, as a minimum, three nested levels: to plot action and motivation for any given character in a story; to create believable well-motivated interactions between characters within the story (they will also mentalize); and to predict how an audience might interpret these scenarios (Figure 4) .
We infer agency, simulate response and create narrative scenarios to predict the motivation of entities in real life and characters in fictional narrative. We do this in response to fiction in order to simulate hypothetical real-life scenarios and we have evolved to find this adaptive and aesthetically rewarding. Engagement with characters in these scenarios involves narrative empathy -a vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect that can be evoked by perceiving another's emotional state, either directly or indirectly through narrative. Simulation is hypothesized by some theorists to be the basis of emotional resonance, emotion contagion and empathy (Goldman and Sripada, 2005) . 'Emotional contagion comes into play in our reactions to narrative, for we are also story-sharing creatures' (Keen, 2006) . Recent studies (using animated cues) have also shown that not only empathy but goal contagion can result from watching others strive to achieve their goals (Dik and Aarts, 2007) , and is strengthened by perceived effort involved. Conway et al. (2003) studied the difference in memories of experienced events vis-à-vis imagined events 8 and found that 'memories of experienced events contain sensory-perceptual knowledge stored in occipital networks whereas memories for imagined events contain generic imagery generated from frontal networks' (p. 334). These findings support methods such as Stanislavsky's, where experienced affective events are recalled to feed imagined emotion-based events enabling authentically motivated action rather than generic performance. Writers do the same when drawing from what Graham Greene called the compost heap of sensual and emotional experience in episodic memory to create novels or screenplays, and the application in animation is self-evident. Sensual and emotional cues are likewise crucial in narrative depiction, underpinning what practitioners across media often articulate as show, don't tell. Specificity and sensory detail, combined with limited use of abstraction, generalization, Power Character animation and the embodied mind-brain 39 Figure 4 Simulation-based mentalizing, or mind-reading, is involved in diverse aspects of narrative-based character animation. summary and analysis is crucial for narrative believability and authenticity (Butler, 2006: 16) . This body-based spell of the sensuous helps avoid generic or formulaic storytelling and to bridge the gap between imagined and authentic experience. Sensuous detail does not necessarily have to be realistic; it can for example be metaphorical or stylized. As Whitfield (2006) states, notions of authenticity 'depend as much on emotional and psychological plausibility as they do on physical accuracy -and the brain will swallow almost anything, provided it comes in the form of a story' (p. 922).
Believability and style
Believability and authenticity in narrative, in particular 3D animation, is often confused with realistic representation, and realism (defined in this context as audio-visual verisimilitude) is one of animation's more contentious stylistic issues. Disney decided realism was the way ahead during the making of Pinocchio (1940), and sought 'more of a threedimensional quality' (Leslie, 2004: 203) . This quest for realism coincided with the studio's abandonment of any radical aesthetic that was evident in some of its earlier films.
Brain scans can tell us something about the aesthetics of realism too and, although interpreting scans of the most complex known entity in the universe can be tricky, there is definite potential to shed light on perceptual and aesthetic phenomena relevant to animation. The Waking Life study found that video footage caused more activity in brain areas associated with mentalizing whereas the equivalent rotoscoped animated scenes caused more activity in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (associated with emotional reward). Interpretation of these results is not definitive, but it looks like the more realistic footage triggered mentalizing more strongly, while the animated footage may have been more emotionally rewarding. This is what might reasonably be expected: that the more realistic the imagery, the more it triggered agency and intent, whereas the 'peculiarly rich experience' (Whitfield, 2006: 923) afforded by the animated dreamscapes might register more aesthetic or emotional reward. These works aim in the opposite direction stylistically from ultra-realistic 3D animated features, and embrace a deliberate stylization of imagery for expressive effect, using the medium as metaphor -the imagery reflecting the altered state of mind of the characters.
Eschewing realism creatively can enable an engaging experience but pursuing it can prove problematic. Realism seems to elicit more engagement from viewers up to a point, until slight mismatches become uncanny and people find them strange; this is the 'uncanny valley' (Mar and Macrae, 2006: 120) . The uncanny valley concept came from robotics research in Japan by Masahiro Mori in 1970, and comes into play when animated phenomena look very realistic but not quite real, and the brain registers the subtle mismatch resulting in loss of emotional engagement or even repulsion. MacDorman and Ishiguro (2006) have documented a number of possible explanations for the uncanny valley, ranging from expectation violation and cognitive paradoxes to evolutionary aesthetics, disgust-based pathogen avoidance and fear of death, and they advocate integration of 'social, cognitive, and neuroscientific' approaches in addressing the issue. Ramachandran's (2004) neuroesthetic concept of abhorrence of coincidence (p. 44) may also help to explain the brain's rejection of this mismatch. Chaminade et al. (2007: 213) seem to support this in finding that such incongruities 'are more demanding cognitively'. It seems as if we focus emotionally on what is not quite right in this context, on the strange embodied in the familiar.
The uncanny valley phenomenon has become most salient recently where highly realistic motion capture data have been used to animate slightly less realistic models, and have been widely blamed for the relative failures of the animated features Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Hironobu Sakaguchi, 2001) , and The Polar Express (Robert Zemeckis, 2004) , (Aldred, 2006; Chaminade et al., 2007; Ward, 2006) . Reviews referred to phenomena such as human residue glinting creepily beneath the characters' animated surfaces -an unintended effect of live action/animation fusion that impacts negatively on what Manovich (2006) calls 'hybrid aesthetics' (p. 26). Ward (2006: 243) describes the phenomenon as hypermediacy that unintentionally attracts attention. Animators at Sony Pictures Imageworks have since learned (e.g. with Monster House, Gil Kenan, 2006) to tweak the motion capture using keyframing to mitigate this strangeness. John Lasseter (1994) also suggests softening motion capture using keyframing: 'motion capture from human actors will always look realistic . . . for a human. But apply that motion to a chicken and it will look like a human in a chicken suit'. He suggests caricaturing the movement to match the design of the stylized character. Ramachandran's (2004) neuroesthetic concept of peak shift, the idea of ultra-normal or exaggerated stimuli, is equivalent to caricature. He predicts that the brain's fusiform gyrus is activated when we derive aesthetic pleasure from caricature (p. 44). The brain seems happy to accept caricature but not an uncanny mismatch. Of course, the uncanny valley effect can be used to aesthetic advantage, too, and has been in such films as Westworld (Michael Crichton, 1973 ), Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982 , 1992 and The Terminator (James Cameron, 1984) , where ambiguity vis-à-vis a character's nature as human or android can add to intrigue and suspense.
The mind-brain can happily accept a circle chasing a square as characters in a narrative, but may register repulsion at a realistic simulation with a slight mismatch in its modalities. This may in part be due to the heightened mentalizing triggered by the realistic imagery as discussed earlier and the fact that we are likely to be most sensitive to subtleties when it comes to realistic representations of ourselves as humans (Guthrie, 1995: 131) . A related phenomenon can be observed in a pedagogical context where animation students often try to create realistic renderings of humans that don't quite work out. This detracts from animated narratives that could be more engaging if they were more stylized, iconic or even abstract characters designed in such a way that they could be perceived as being intended aesthetic abstractions rather than realistic attempts that do not quite convince. Less realistic synthetic movement has been shown to be more readily accepted as natural if the character is less realistic in form (Chaminade et al., 2007) .
Realism has been the goal of most technological development in 3D animation technology: modelling the physics of light and colour, and more recently gravity, turbulence and other forces -an attempt at 'recreating reality step-by-step from scratch' (Manovich, 2006: 30) . The realism 3D animation aspires to is not that of ontological reality necessarily, but a hyper-realism mimicking that of live action cinema. The dominant metaphor in 3D animation applications interfaces is that of film, and various effects included in these systems, such as motion blur, depth of field and lens flare, mimic the constraints, even the defects of camera technology although, as Manovich (p. 38) points out, they become more fluid and flexible in a digital environment. The mode of production tends towards what he calls virtual cinematography, and the output towards cinematic realism. 3D projection in cinemas (seen as the future direction of all the main players in feature animation) will continue this trend, increasing immersive realism and helping to differentiate a theatre release market from domestic DVD and home entertainment markets.
This realistic approach does not necessarily converge with aesthetic excellence. We scan the world after all, not for reality, but for meaning; an emotion-based inference of what likely scenarios mean for us. Scott McCloud (1994) in his groundbreaking work Understanding Comics considers that iconic imagery can have a rhetorical advantage over realism in that our image of self is necessarily more iconic than that of the other so we can identify more naturally with an iconic agent. Similarly Ramachandran's (2004) neuroesthetic concept of isolation (p. 44) is equivalent to the design aphorism less is more. The neural basis of this is a bottleneck of attention; realistic imagery has lots of information that can be seen as noise, whereas stylized imagery can isolate the essence of a character.
Converging with Scott McCloud's (1994) analysis of expressive brushstrokes, simulation theory suggests that the quality of the artist's gestures embedded in the work can induce empathetic engagement through active simulation, and that 'visible traces of goal-directed movements' will activate the mirror-neuron system (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007: 202) . This is described as 'feeling the movement behind the mark', and helps explain some of the aesthetic appeal of expressive work that foregrounds strokes or gouges or other indexical artefacts of its construction. Along with neuroesthetic concepts such as Ramachandran's (2004) isolation, metaphor and caricature, this resonates with the increased aesthetic response to expressive rotoscoped animation scenes in Waking Life vis-à-vis the original video footage, and with more active embodied engagement with the expressive nature of some other animation techniques compared with hyper-realistic 3D CGI.
Conclusion
The investigation of relevant research from diverse fields of study and the exploration of what they might in synthesis contribute to animation is timely. This is particularly true of imaging-based research, as technological innovations such as fMRI scanners are beginning to produce findings that have relevance for the arts in general and for animation in particular. 'The function of art is an extension of the function of the brain . . . the mechanisms used to instil meaning into this world are the very ones used to instil meanings into works of art' (Zeki, 2004: 173) . Both animation and science are products of human activity. 'They arise from complex bio-chemical processes and systems, too. Thus, art and science, and their products are also natural phenomena that can be studied as part of scientific research' (Sorensen, 2005) . 'Creativity in culture and language reiterates culture in nature; it springs, in metaphor as in symbiogenesis, from the joining together of different things in newly productive and complex ways' (Wheeler, 2006: 134) . Artists and scientists 'need transdisciplinary, or mutual education' (Sorensen, 2003) , and for animators this can, in Ward's (2006: 244) terminology, recontextualize aspects of their art.
These new interdisciplinary approaches are not without their problems. One recent report has called for caution, as explanations that allude to neuroscience are often accepted uncritically (Weisberg et al., 2008) . Modell (2006) warns of naïve reductionism (citing behaviourism) and calls instead for a 'pluralistic epistemology' in line with Nagel's view that mental states have a 'tripartite essencephenomenological, functional, and physiological' (p. 201). These are early speculative days for neuroesthetics, and proponents such as Zeki, Ramachandran, Freedberg and Livingstone acknowledge this whilst being adamant that their approach is worthwhile. Patricia Smith Churchland (2002) asks us to bear in mind that neuroscientific research is in its infancy and 'does not yet have a firm grasp of the basic principles explaining its target phenomena' (p. 32), while Lindenberger (2007) compares our exploration of the brain to 'exploration of the New World around, say, the mid-sixteenth century'. So, regarding 'how the arts and the brain engage with one another, we may yet be in for a few surprises' (p. 17). We must accept that our paradigmatic understanding of the mind-brain will 'shift and shift again' and that the real conceptual revolution is yet to come (Churchland, 2002: 32) . Lindenberger (2007) asks if science simply helps corroborate what was known all along, and if we just need the prestige of science 'to validate the importance of art in our lives ' (p. 8) . He concludes that, despite the huge historical and cultural diversity of the arts, there is more we can learn than simply 'that the effects of art can be observed emanating from specific networks in the brain and that these effects can be measured'. Such neuroscientific forays into the arts, he says, are typically well focused and 'unlike many of us in the humanities, they do not reach out for global-size theories'. He suggests that, despite this modesty, 'a larger picture seems to be emerging, a picture that suggests we may come to know more about how we perceive, process and enjoy art than we suspected before' (p. 8). For Churchland (2002) , coming decades will see 'intuitions surprised and dogmas routed. We will find ourselves making sense of mental phenomena in neurobiological terms, while unmasking some classical puzzles as preneuroscientific misconceptions' (p. 32).
Livingstone (2005) predicts that 'as biologists learn more about the biology of vision, artists may uncover a new trove of techniques for creating compelling and realistic images'. For Gallese and Freedberg (2007) 'embodied and empathetic responses, too long neglected, have a much wider role in esthetic responses than hitherto acknowledged', and henceforth no form of aesthetic appreciation 'can be fully envisaged without considering mirror systems and their role in embodied and empathetic responses' (p. 441). Significantly they acknowledge that consideration of simulation-based neural processes in no way undermines or contradicts the relevance of cultural or historical context (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007: 202) .
There is no doubt that findings from these fields will impact ever more saliently on our comprehension of how the embodied mind-brain creates, experiences and understands animation and other arts. Those discussed here, though just the beginning, can help inform our understanding of anthropomorphism, character motivation, narrative believability and style. There will be much more to come that will enable a deeper understanding of the creative animation process. We can ignore such emerging contextual theory or we can welcome it as a new and active ingredient in the creative compost heap, comprising a pluralistic epistemology that nurtures creativity and enables animation studies to flourish. Such interdisciplinary payback is both necessary and appropriate as, for over a century now, through its diverse aesthetics, animation has been radical in exploring the nature of both the mind and the human condition.
Notes 1
Livingstone distinguishes between two visual subsystems that are distinct both in location and function. One pathway, the what system for face and object recognition, is evolutionarily recent and common to primates only. The older where system that processes motion, depth and space is shared with other mammals. This system is higher acuity but completely colour-blind. This division can enable new approaches to visual effects and give insights into extant effects in animation (such as why rough colour fills can seem to flood cartoon outlines without registering a mismatch). 2 Originally discovered in Italy by Giaccomo Rizzolatti and his team working with macaque monkeys, they are found in the ventral premotor cortex. 3 Mirror-neurons are advocated as being involved in everything from imitation, ToM (theory of mind), learning, language, empathy, social understanding, and the human capacity for culture, and it is worth noting that much of this research is speculative and ongoing. 4 ST is contested (mainly by folk ToM or theory theory proponents) and there are several ST variants, but simulation is consistently seen as a fundamental contributor to the complex processes of mentalizing and empathy involved in social perception. 5 At a more fundamental level, all engagement with narrative-based audio-visual media is driven by similar phenomena. 6 Modell (2006) considers metaphor as 'doubly embodied, first as an unconscious neural process and second in that metaphors are generated from bodily feelings, so that it is possible to speak of a corporeal imagination' (p. 27). Following Damasio he interprets feeling as the conscious perception of emotion, but considers this a metaphorical process. 7 Whitfield (2006: 923) quotes Gerrig, a psychologist, as saying 'people believe everything, and one must expend effort to disbelieve'. Disbelief, he argues, is not the default and suspension of disbelief but actually works the other way round. Freedberg and Gallese (2007) quote Damasio's idea that 'the brainwithin 'simulation mode' -reproduces the somatic states seen in or implied by the painting or sculpture 'as if' the body were present' (p. 201). 8 Using EEG (better temporal resolution), and integrating results from PET and fMRI (better spatial resolution).
